

“NEW TOKYO. NEW TOMORROW. (NEW G20).” – HARD POWER, SOFT POWER, SMART POWER?*

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Abstract: *With reference to the statement of the former US Secretary of State James Baker talking about the new post-Cold-War community of democracies that would “stretch from Vancouver to Vladivostok” Mahubani [1: 42-43] points out the position of Japan as the first and until then the exclusive Asian member of the “Western club” represented by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G7. Throughout most of recorded history Asia (embodying the biggest share of the world’s population) has enjoyed the biggest share of the world’s economy, with three of the four largest economies in the world by 2050 (in the respective order: China; USA; India; Japan) envisaged by a Goldman Sachs BRICs study to be Asian, he continues, when claiming that: “Japan surged ahead of the rest of Asia because it understood the message of Western success [brought about by the Industrial Revolution] almost a hundred and fifty years earlier”; the Japanese (Meiji reformers) “were willing to consider Western best practices from any country and were prepared to mix and match policies in an eclectic fashion”; and adding that “the Chinese had learned from Singapore, and Singapore from Japan” [1: 51-52, 77-78].*

*The so-called “new Asian Great Game” (Mahubani, 2011 cited in [2: 291]) refers to the “geoeconomics (“traditionally” alias **soft power**) versus geopolitics (“traditionally” alias **hard power**)” challenge: “The most severe challenge facing rising powers in Asia in particular is the growing severity of natural resource constraints, especially land and water, which are not easily amenable to technological solutions and which (unlike energy) cannot be augmented by trade” [2: 309]. As formulated by Staněk [3] the current Fourth Industrial Revolution mirrors the society, revealing the (il)logic of today’s architecture of the society; the question, therefore, is if we are willing to accept this fact and if we are aware of the necessity of changes, and as individual civilisation models react differently to the same conditions (namely, differences in languages, history and society affect the implementation as well as impact of technological changes), it is essential to comprehend the mutual impact of the speed of technological changes and the speed of adaptation both of society and individuals. Thus, a “**smart power**” dimension arises – in the case of Japan represented by its Society 5.0 concept [4: 119-122].*

The more inclusive format of G20 (designated since the latest global financial crisis as “the world’s “premier forum” for economic cooperation”) “is playing a mid-field game: facilitating discussion while standing by for (rare) emergencies. This operational model more closely mirrors Asian than Western approaches to governance, and may be a harbinger of change in the global system” as Dobson & Petri [5: 261, 273-274] perceive it. Hence, along with illustration in a comparative case study (Japan and the Slovak Republic) addressing the United Nations SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities), we focus on the 28-29 June 2019 G20 Osaka Summit in terms of the prospect of a know-how transfer in the OECD context.

Keywords: *Japan, Slovak Republic, UN SDGs, G20, OECD, hard power, soft power, smart power, Society 5.0, education*

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1. INTRODUCTION

“In the nineteenth century it was taken for granted – especially in Europe – that the objective of a nation-state was to enhance its power, colonize other nations, and develop large spheres of influence. In the twentieth century – as evidenced by the behaviour of Germany and Japan after World War II – national power was enhanced by increasing the size of the economy. Competition in the nineteenth century for political influence and territorial control was a zero-sum game. Competition in the second half of the twentieth century could become a positive sum game. Growing economies could benefit, not harm, each other. They could grow together.” Mahbubani [1: 80].

Reischauer & Craig [6] claimed that within the region of the so-called *Far East* or *East Asia* Japan has sustained its uniqueness throughout most of its history owing to its archipelago and relative remoteness. In terms of chronology from *kodai* (the Ancient Age) through *chūsei* (the Middle Ages) to *kinsei* (the pre-modern period) and *kindai* (the Modern Age) the latter two overlapping eras are distinguished by the Industrial Revolution and participation of Japan in the world economy in the 19th century.

Bouvier points out in his *Chronique japonaise* [7: 106] that the country “*imposed a quarantine upon itself*” (similarly to an autarchy represented by the Chinese empire in the 18th century) and sheds light onto the so-called *Pax Tokugawa*. *Sakoku* (alias “*closed country*”) having been characterised by a policy of strict regulations and limitations of outward interactions under the *Tokugawa Shogunate Era* (1600-1868), “[*i*n the 1860s, a group of Meiji reformers – who were determined to save Japan from the fate of Western colonization or domination that had engulfed most of Asia – sailed to all the leading Western societies to discover the best practices of the West. [...] [The Japanese] were willing to consider Western best practices from any country and were prepared to mix and match policies in an eclectic fashion.”, as Mahbubani [1: 52] puts it.

Bearing in mind a sample of studies/reports carried out ([4], [8] – [11]) and the recently released awaited updated analysis ([12]) of an unpublished manuscript ([3]), this paper aims to address the prospect of Japanese know-how transfer vis-à-vis its *Society 5.0* concept in the OECD context within the interactive process between the G20 and the OECD in a “zoom-in”/“zoom-out” comparative perspective – with reference to recently released data – as well as challenges that lay ahead, taking into consideration the scope and limits of such analysis.³

2. SMART POWER

“The decision to hold the 2020 Olympics and Paralympics in Tokyo has been made, and there is momentum that supports the Cool Japan strategy. [...] Through our discussions we realized that what is expected from Cool Japan is not simply some economic effects achieved by introducing and promoting Japanese culture. Japan is well versed in facing and tackling challenges, and has already been addressing a number of difficulties, including a declining birthrate and an aging population, environmental and energy issues, and financial reconstruction that many countries are likely to face in the near future. Japan is a nation of innovation that since long ago has flexibly imported the products of foreign cultures and developed them as its original culture, amid its harsh environment of limited land and a lack of resources. Japan should now take the initiative in solving difficult issues by using the originality and ingenuity characteristic of its people, and thus become a world leader. Japan’s brand value as a nation will be raised

³ Cf. methodological pluralism claimed by N. Hynek [13: 173].

if other countries in the world can use Japan’s case as a reference when challenged by similar problems. In other words, I hereby declare that, “Japan, a country providing creative solutions to the world’s challenges,” is the new mission of Cool Japan.” Declaration of Cool Japan’s Mission by the respective Minister in charge of the “Cool Japan” strategy [8].

The title of our paper linked to the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (“*New Tokyo. New Tomorrow.*”) also takes notice of the projection that three of the four largest economies in the world by 2050 (in the respective order: China; USA; India; Japan) are to be Asian.

Should we in this very context take into account that “*genuine digitisation, application of AI [Artificial Intelligence – authors’ remark] and autonomous systems will probably eventually lead to significant reduction in the overall volume of individual and societal consumption [and eventually possibly a shrinking rather than a burgeoning economy]” [12: 70], let us dwell on nowadays a universal slogan “Make XYZ great (again).” by first contemplating what it takes to be “great (again)” – is it “Hard power, soft power, smart power?”. Then, Japan’s vision of societal progress for the future will be in our focus; and, finally, we will seek illustration in a comparative case study (Japan and the Slovak Republic) addressing the *United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11: Sustainable cities and communities.**

2.1. International Cooperation

*“Pour optimiser sa puissance, un État doit donc œuvrer à faire concorder les objectifs de son soft et de son hard power. La combinaison harmonieuse des deux est appelée « puissance intelligente » (smart power) par Nye, qui développe cette notion, forgée dès 2004 par Suzanne Nossel, dans son livre de 2011 intitulé *Le Futur de la puissance*. Il y insiste sur le fait que, dans le monde du XXI^e siècle, seule une combinaison intelligente des ressources de l’influence et de la contrainte peut permettre à un pays de parvenir à ses fins. Au contraire, miser sur l’une ou l’autre seulement des deux faces de la puissance ne peut suffire à peser sur la scène internationale.” Louis [14: 161-162].*

Since *power* as one of central concepts in the area of international relations may be referred to in terms of geography; demography; impact or development of economic nature; governance; diplomacy; national identity or military terms among others (Drulák in [15: 179-182]), S. Strange – whose contribution to the establishment and development of the *international political economy* (examining the political background of economic processes just like the economic background of political processes) was vital – identified *structural power* on the grounds of the *knowledge* structure, the *financial* structure, the *security* structure, and the *production* structure [16: 43]. F. Munier [17: 52-53] quotes J. Nye’s perception of two “faces of power” (*alias* Ares & Aphrodite) as an analogy to *hard power* & *soft power* with classification in Table 1, which follows.

Table 1: Forms of power by Nye (abridged from [14: 162])

<i>Forms of power</i>	<i>Hard power</i>		<i>Soft power</i>
Components	economic power	military power	co-optive power and soft power distinguished in 1990
Means	investments/ subventions sanctions	threats coercion	popular culture/values country policy
Combination	<i>Smart power</i>		

In this respect, one needs to keep in mind that specification of *hard power* & *soft power* varies in literature; hence, should *smart power* represent an amalgamation of both *hard power* and *soft power* as shown in Table 1, it may be “eloquently” expressed by the term “*je ne sais quoi*”. When applied in the case of Japan with adherence to the classification offered by J. Nye (as abridged from [14: 162] in Table 1), the “*Cool Japan*” strategy might be associated with *soft power*, and “super-smart” is the characteristics of *Society 5.0* (alias *smart power*), to which we are going to draw attention now.

2.2. Society 5.0

“The essence of Society 5.0 is that it will become possible to quickly elicit the most suitable solution that meets the needs of each individual.” Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the International Conference of the Future of Asia in 2017 [18].

As a consequence of the famous Imperial Charter Oath: “*Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world.*” under the 1868 Meiji Restoration, “*an influx of goods, ideas, and people from Europe and the United States set in that contributed to a fundamental transformation of Japanese society*”; Conrad [19: 608-609] also emphasises that the Japanese modernization project is to be perceived in the context of a backdrop of interactions in East Asia, and continues: “*According to the ideology of the time, Japan’s colonial conquest was a means both to exhibit power status and to transmit what Japan had learned from the West to the less ,civilized’ neighbors in the region. Frequently, however, the colonies were more than areas of supposedly benevolent intervention, or objects of exploitative politics; rather, they were seen as large testing grounds for – sometimes competing – Japanese visions of modernity. The puppet state of Manchukuo, in particular, from the late 1920s served the function of a laboratory of social reform in which the colonial state experimented with labour politics, interventions in the economy, city planning and urbanism.*”.

The practice of “one emperor, one era name” launched with the *Meiji* (alias the “M”) *Era* (1868-1912) was followed by the *Taisho* (alias the “T”) *Era* (1912-1926); the *Showa* (alias the “S”) *Era* (1926-1989); the *Heisei* (alias the “H”) *Era* (1989-2019); up to the current *Reiwa* (alias the “R”) *Era* (following the ascent of *Emperor Naruhito* to the Chrysanthemum Throne in May 2019) [20]. With the chronology of *Society 1.0* (alias the Hunting society), *Society 2.0* (alias the Farming society), *Society 3.0* (alias the Industrial society), *Society 4.0* (alias the Information society), it is *Society 5.0* (alias the Super smart society) outlined in Japan’s 5th *Science and Technology Basic Plan* that is the country’s vision of societal progress for the future.

Defined by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan as a “*human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space*”, the vision of *Society 5.0* builds on data made accessible in the framework of *Society 4.0* that are to be ensued by interactive cooperation and legislative amendments; furthermore, research/development/innovation and education are crucial for adaptability of the society. Staněk & Mařík & Doliak & Ondrovič [12: 54-55] highlight the civilisational contrast when “*the Euro-American model targets production of robots aimed at increasing productivity, efficiency, profitability, market acquisition, etc.*”, arguing that, paradoxically, perception in economic as well as societal terms rests as a matter of fact on the rationale of the 19th century or the first half of the 20th century: market expansion; profitability at any cost; and productivity resulting from depletion of resources or draining of production factors.

Accordingly, they raise the point if it makes sense when taking into account that income polarisation, as a considerably limiting factor of consumption as we know it, has been on the rise.

The case of Japan is certainly one of particular interest – representing a symbiosis of an economy with global outreach, sophisticated (high-tech) development and protection of own cultural heritage; therefore, we now turn our attention to a comparative illustration addressing target 11.4 of the United Nations *SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities)* oriented on strengthening efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage.

2.3. United Nations *SDG 11: The Case of Japan and Slovakia*

“One of India’s most famous industrialists is Ratan Tata. [...] In late 2005 he told an interesting story. He said that for many years he would travel around India and try to persuade people to learn from Singapore’s experience. The inevitable response he got was this: “Singapore is so small. India is so big. What can big India learn from Singapore?” However, when China began to take off in the 1990s and Ratan Tata said that India could learn from China, his fellow Indians could not say that China was too small for India to learn from. The Indian economy began to open up in 1991, mostly because of the balance of payments crisis, but partially also because of the lessons from China as well as the fear of being left behind. Few Indians knew that the Chinese had learned from Singapore, and Singapore from Japan.” Mahbubani [1: 77-78].

In three decades between the 1950s and early 1980s Japan experienced the so-called economic miracle with its share on world GDP multiplying from 3% to 13% [21: 122-123]. According to the 2019 edition of *The Economist Pocket World in Figures*, both Tokyo (as the biggest city in the world represented by urban agglomerations on the basis of 2017 population data) and Osaka (the 8th biggest city in the world represented by urban agglomerations on the basis of 2017 population data) rank in city liveability top 10 in terms of the *Economist Intelligence Unit Liveability Index* with global coverage based on a spectrum of factors such as stability, health care, culture, education and infrastructure [22: 19-20]. Indeed, achieving *Society 5.0* “would enable not just Japan but the world as well to realize economic development while solving key social problems. It would also contribute to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) established by the United Nations. Japan aims to become the first country in the world to achieve a human-centered society (*Society 5.0*) in which anyone can enjoy a high quality of life full of vigor. It intends to accomplish this by incorporating advanced technologies in diverse industries and social activities and fostering innovation to create new value.” [10].

Ranking of Japan in the *Sustainable Development Report Dashboard 2019* is 15th of 162 (SDG Global Index value of 78.9 in [23]) compared to the one of the Slovak Republic (ranking 27th of 162 and SDG Global Index value of 76.2 in [24]), with their shared (OECD) regional average score of 77.7. In terms of the *NIHON-GATARI-SHO – Guidelines for Narrating Japanese Culture* [9: 30-31] “Japan’s signature skill may be said to reside in analogy. [...] Moreover, while exhibiting the power of analogy and a talent for arrangement, Japan competes by combining strengths.”

Historically, assemblage of architecture and garden design (198 buildings and 12 gardens) in the surviving *Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto (Kyoto, Uji and Otsu Cities)* as the highest expression of such aspect of Japanese material culture in the pre-modern period received UNESCO World Heritage recognition in 1994. Until the middle of the 19th century Kyoto was the imperial capital of Japan and as a centre of the Japanese culture for over 1,000 years it illustrates

the general historical development of Japanese (wooden, particularly religious) architecture, and “the art of Japanese gardens, which has influenced landscape gardening the world over” [25].

In the Slovak case of UNESCO World Heritage 1993 inscription and 2009 extension, “[t]he castle of Spišský hrad, the town of Levoča, the associated sites in Spišské Podhradie, Spišská Kapitula, and Žehra constitute a remarkable group of military, urban, political, and religious elements, of a type that was relatively common in medieval Europe, but of which almost none have survived in such a complete condition with equivalent integrity. Levoča, Spišský hrad and the associated cultural monuments is one of the most extensive groups of military, urban, and religious buildings from the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance in Eastern Europe, the Romanesque and Gothic architecture of which has remained remarkably intact in Spišský hrad, Spišské Podhradie, Spišská Kapitula, and Žehra, together with the urban plan of Levoča. It is a group belonging to the same Saxon colonial settlement in the Middle Ages, of which it illustrates the material and cultural successes.” [26].

A comparison of commentaries on integrity as well as management and protection status in both cases is, therefore, facilitated in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Integrity, management and protection status
(abridged from UNESCO World Heritage)

<i>UNESCO World Heritage sites</i>	<i>Integrity</i>	<i>Management and protection</i>
<i>Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto (Kyoto, Uji and Otsu Cities)</i>	The buildings and gardens composing the property retain high levels of authenticity in terms of form/design, materials/substance, traditions/techniques, and location/setting.	The Agency for Cultural Affairs, Kyoto and Shiga Prefectures, and Kyoto, Uji and Otsu Cities provide the owners of the component parts with both financial assistance and technical guidance for their protection and management.
<i>Levoča, Spišský hrad and the associated cultural monuments</i>	The degree of authenticity of the property is satisfactory. Special attention should, however, be given to the quality of the maintenance and restoration work on the private buildings of Levoča.	The protection of the property and the management plan and its practical organization are adequate. However, they need to be strengthened and improved in certain respects and the management plan needs to be published.
UN SDGs relevance: SDG 11	11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage	

A lesson that could be learned from the UNESCO World Heritage site *Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto (Kyoto, Uji and Otsu Cities)*, which is “one of the most typical World Heritage sites situated in urban context”, was formulated as follows: “Although its component parts are limited to temples, shrines and a castle, it is quite crucial to protect its surrounding context as well as the property itself in an integrated manner, in order to transmit its Outstanding Universal Value to the future generations.” This is why the local authority (Kyoto city) introduced a new landscape policy in 2007 along with its engagement in activities to preserve the sites and monuments of the inscribed properties. “In the face of a society declining in population, and based upon understanding that the city has entered an age of city competition where each city appeals to its uniqueness to vie for allure as a city, the new policy is aimed to conserve and improve its landscape in order to generate a new added value of enhancement to its city character and allure. It would result in increased residence and population for interaction, concentration of excellent human resources, investment growth in local industry, tourist industry, knowledge

based industry, etc.”, the proposal for best practice in terms of a new landscape policy in a broader and long-term perspective further reads and concludes: “*Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto should be one of the best practices, because it would be an advanced case in the context of historic urban conservation against broad issues in the modern city, which could cause irreversible damage of the Outstanding Universal Value of the World Heritage property.*” [27].

3. CONCLUSION

“*Modern Japan has been profoundly shaped by its transnational contexts, while at the same time herself shaping these contexts.*” Conrad [19: 608].

Let us briefly recall Mahbubani [1: 74] stating that Japan was the first Asian country to modernise – namely, having watched Europe to colonise most of the world, it was quick to realise that it had to change and adapt.

In our title “*New Tokyo. New Tomorrow. (New G20).*” – *Hard power, soft power, smart power?* of this paper we outlined a trajectory from the short-term (*new imperial era “Reiwa”* since 2019) through the medium-term (*Society 5.0*) to the long-term perspective (shift from *hard power* via *soft power* to *smart power*).

We have already indicated to the reader that the title of our paper is linked to the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (“*New Tokyo. New Tomorrow.*”), but we have not commented our extension: (“*New G20.*”) It is now that we come to the point when we wish to elucidate that under the 2019 Japanese G20 Presidency the *Society 5.0* strategy was brought to the attention of the G20 at the G20 Osaka Summit held on 28-29 June 2019 as follows: “*Innovation is an important driver for economic growth, which can also contribute to advancing towards the SDGs and enhancing inclusiveness. We will work toward achieving an inclusive, sustainable, safe, trustworthy and innovative society through digitalization and promoting the application of emerging technologies. We share the notion of a human-centered future society, which is being promoted by Japan as Society 5.0. As digitalization is transforming every aspect of our economies and societies, we recognize the critical role played by effective use of data, as an enabler of economic growth, development and social well-being. We aim to promote international policy discussions to harness the full potential of data. [...] The responsible development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be a driving force to help advance the SDGs and to realize a sustainable and inclusive society. To foster public trust and confidence in AI technologies and fully realize their potential, we commit to a human-centered approach to AI, and welcome the non-binding G20 AI Principles, drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Recommendation on AI.*” [28].

As signposted in the respective *G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration* from the G20 Osaka summit, reference was made to the *OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence* anchored in the *OECD 2019 Ministerial Council Statement “Harnessing Digital Transition for Sustainable Development: Opportunities and Challenges”* [29], which was adopted in May 2019. Henceforth, the OECD will seek integrated and evidence-based policy analysis, technical solutions and expertise on digital transition.

This brings to our mind that Staněk & Ivanová [11: 167] have reminded us that the one feature adapting to a negligible extent has been the mankind, which Staněk [3] reiterated by stating that “*[i]t is impossible to change only technological design of society and not the civilisation itself*”. In this regard in terms of

the prospect of a know-how transfer in the OECD context in the interactive process between the OECD and the G20 we wish to highlight the Japanese concept focused on human skills with emphasis on communication, leadership and endurance, curiosity, comprehension and reading skills. In the words of the Japanese Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Yoshimasa Hayashi: “We have to give students the skills to both survive that changing society and for them to lead that change.” [18]. So with implication to “a world where technology is integrated into nearly every part of society”, the prospect of a know-how transfer in the OECD context within the interactive process between the OECD and the G20 might encompass *inter alia* shifts that would be relevant to traditional education systems worldwide, such as more flexibility in addressing gaps in understanding and “removing the barriers between subjects and disciplines”, *alias* interdisciplinarity, “for the next generation to be prepared for the super-smart future” [18].

In summary, in our reflection presented in this paper we considered evolution of *smart power* in the Japanese context by exploring the background of *smart power*; the “Cool Japan” strategy and the *Society 5.0* vision with the **explicit prospect of a know-how transfer in the OECD context** within the interactive process between the OECD and the G20. **Implicitly**, however, the **prospect of a broader know-how transfer** stretching beyond the OECD context in terms of the 2025 *World Expo* (Osaka-Kansai Japan Expo under the theme “*Designing Future Society for Our Lives*” [30]) and providing an opportunity to further shape *smart power* in the Japanese context may be illustrated by simply adhering to the respective stakeholder focus and theme both in the legacy of the UNESCO World Heritage site *Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto* (“*New landscape policy, long-term view*”) with implications for UN SDG 11, and in the case of the 2020 *Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics* (“*New Tokyo. New Tomorrow.*”).

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