Ana Radulovic – Faculty of Maritime Studies Kotor, Montenegro
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/ERAZ.2020.99
6th International Conference – ERAZ 2020 – KNOWLEDGE BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Online/virtual, May 21, 2020, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
Published by: Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans – Belgrade, Serbia
Conference partners: Faculty of Economics and Business, Mediterranean University, Montenegro; University of National and World Economy – Sofia, Bulgaria; Faculty of Commercial and Business Studies – Celje, Slovenia; Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance – Belgrade, Serbia
ISSN 2683-5568, ISBN 978-86-80194-33-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/ERAZ.2020
Abstract
Economic structures are a major cause of long-term growth or stagnation. Different economic
structures have different ranges of structural learning, innovation, and different effects on income
distribution, which are key determinants of economic performance. Through theory about economic
structures it is explained why institutions work differently in space and time. This paper shows using a
case study in the United States, that the source of recent financial crises rests on the structural characteristics
of the economy. Constant deindustrialization is increasing inequality, and a debt-intensive
credit boom has emerged to offset the deflationary effects of this structural change. The strong application
of the austerity system in Europe and other parts of the world, even after the evidence points to less
frugal policies, illustrates the theory of power it has over public policy. The economic structure should
be put at the center of analysis, to better understand the economic changes, income disparities and
differences in the dynamics of political economy through time and space. This paper provides a critical
overview of the rapidly developing comparative studies of institutions and economic performance, with
an emphasis on its analytical and political implications. The paper tries to identify some conceptual
gaps in the literature on economic growth policy. Emphasis is placed on the contrasting experiences
of East Asia and Latin America. This paper argues that the future investments in this field should be
based on rigorous conceptual difference between the rules of the game and the game, and between the
political and institutional, embedded in the concept of management. It also emphasizes the importance
of a serious understanding of the endogenous and distributive nature of institutions and steps beyond
the narrow approach of property law relations in management and development. By providing insights
from the political channels through which institutions affect economic performance, this paper aims to
contribute to the consolidation of theoretically based, empirically based and relevant to policy research
on political and institutional foundations of growth and prosperity.
Key words
Financial crises, Structure, Economy.
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