Giorgio Tassinari – Dept. of Statistical Sciences “Paolo Fortunati”, Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Italy
Fabrizio Alboni – Dept. of Economics “Marco Biagi”, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy
Arianna Tassinari – Dept. of Social and Political Sciences, European University Institute, Fiesole, (FI), Italy
Ignazio Drudi – Dept. of Statistical Sciences “Paolo Fortunati”, Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Italy
6th International Conference – ERAZ 2020 – KNOWLEDGE BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Online/virtual, May 21, 2020, SELECTED PAPERS
Published by: Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans – Belgrade, Serbia
Conference partners: Faculty of Economics and Business, Mediterranean University, Montenegro; University of National and World Economy – Sofia, Bulgaria; Faculty of Commercial and Business Studies – Celje, Slovenia; Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance – Belgrade, Serbia
ISBN 978-86-80194-34-9, ISSN 2683-5568, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/ERAZ.
The diffusion of COVID-19 pandemic among Italian Regions has been very uneven. The
intensity of measures introduced to contrast its spread also shows a high heterogeneity among local
jurisdiction, but this does not correspond, prima facie, with the intensity of the pandemic. What shapes
the stringency of responses across different localities? Various factors could be hypothesised to be at
play: factors related to the intensity of the pandemic, to the political and ideological orientation of governing
authorities, to the models of growth and development characterising regional economic systems,
and to the strength of lobbying groups pushing for more or less stringent responses. To address these
questions, we elaborate a regional stringency index and analyse (using CART regression trees and other
statistical methods) its relationships with some of these factors. The results show that the main driver
of stringency (in an inverse way) is the weight of exports on regional GDP, suggesting that economic
interests and business power might play an important role in shaping political responses to pandemics.
Covid-19, Lockdown, Business interests.
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